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ABSTRACT 
Money laundering is the most commonly occurring form of financial crime. This has 
been facilitated by the presence of diverse technology that has made money laundering 
easier. Globally, money laundering is a major concern since it is linked to terrorist 
financing and corruption of the financial systems. In response, the international 
community has strengthened the AML/CFT structures following the terrorist act in the 
Unites States in September 2011. The thesis presents an analysis of the AML 
regulations and the challenges that national governments and the international 
community face when combating money laundering. The main research question is: Is 
the current international anti-money laundering regime sufficiently robust to effectively 
control and limit the phenomenon of international money laundering? This report 
explains the negative effects of money laundering to the economies of countries, the 
international trend-setters of the AML regulations and the challenges faced during the 
implementation of AML policies. After properly studying the literature, there seems to be 
major challenge during the implementation of the AML regulations making money 
laundering a pressing issue in both developing and developed countries. To facilitate 
the implementation of AML framework, nations should create a framework for exchange 
of information. As much as it’s a challenge, there is need for evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the AML structure particularly due to the changes providing new 
techniques for money laundering. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Money laundering is a widespread practice in many nations today. It entails fraudulently 
legitimizing an individual's income and property, an enormous business that results from 
enterprises generating large cash turnover. Indeed, a wide range of criminal and grave 
offenses including smuggling of goods, drug-trafficking, racketeering are only 
operational due to the proceeds of monies that are conveniently laundered ( Gill & 
Taylor , 2004).The diverse technology available today has made money laundering 
easier. Dirty money is infiltrated by smugglers in the financial system of any country. 
Since technological advancement is accessible in all countries, it is easy to relocate 
capital between accounts in different off-shore centers, keeping funds untraceable. 
Globally, laundering is a major concern as it facilitates crime by promoting crime groups, 
diversifying and promoting their growth. Criminals opt for offshore accounts where the 
affected country has several limitations accessing financial information. Money 
laundering is an example of a financial crime where illegal capital flow is incorporated 
into a genuine economic system. To detect such actions, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) was established by G-7 in 1989 to act as a temporary group to develop 
and implement anti-laundering policies. Several common law jurisdictions and many 
civil laws have also criminalized funds laundering. 
This thesis presents a study regarding International Standard Setters of International 
Money Laundering initiatives against money laundering, emphasizing the rise of 
transparency in the financial system and analyzing the consequences for governments 
as well as the private sector. My research question is: Is the current international anti-
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money laundering regime sufficiently robust to effectively control and limit the 
phenomenon of international money laundering? In this regard, while the AML 
regulations enacted by various international bodies over the last decades have provided 
a robust  and sound platform to combat  the practice of money laundering, it is unlikely  
that any set of regulations, no matter how well-designed, could solve this complex and 
multi—faceted problem. The first step of this investigation is to examine the available 
literature, find historical actions and their positive or negative effects on economies, 
then compare these procedures to current international standards and determine their 
effectiveness. 
 
1.0CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
1.1 Introduction 
Article 3 of Vienna convention in 1988 describes this activity as: "The concealment or 
disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect 
to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this paragraph (with 
relation to narcoterrorism) or from an act of participation in such offence or offences" 
(UN, 1988).Current dynamism and trends regarding international trade have also 
resulted in organized crime specialization with money laundering as the final step of 
financial delinquency. This activity seeks to eliminate traceable roots of fraudulently 
obtained funds with the intention of creating a legitimacy aspect. Capital is later brought 
back into the legal market as clean money. Those involved take advantage of the 
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multiple legal gaps and legitimate organization's failure to detect mismatches. But how 
is money laundered? 
First, perpetrators need to be smart enough due to the changing financial investigation 
tactics put into place. Smurfing is one such technique which involves taking a large sum 
of money and breaking it into smaller amounts which can be deposited with less 
suspicion by the authorities. Traffickers also manage to use underground banking 
systems where the money can be deposited with no trace. Individuals involved in 
criminal activities may also employ different professionals in areas such as law, tax 
advisory and accounting who later inject the black capitals in formal financial 
institutions.  Additionally, because of the nature of operations and a lack of a substantial 
charitable activities' legislation, it is very challenging to detect irregular financial 
activities. Institutions can accumulate money by donations and membership fees, and 
funds can be spent to directly or indirectly support terrorist groups and illegal activities. 
 
1.2 Money whitening process 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has described that laundering takes place in 
four distinct stages.  The first step is referred to as the placement stage. It represents 
the primary entry of ‘dirty cash’ in the financial system. It is a crucial stage as it relieves 
the criminal from the bulk cash and places the money in a legal financial system. During 
this juncture, the delinquents' risk of being caught increases as managing large 
amounts of money may raise the alarm. Several methods facilitate this stage. They 
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include gambling, repayment of loans using illegal cash, smurfing where money 
launders perform multiple financial transactions to evade reporting requirements, and 
currency smuggling where money is moved in bulk across borders by packing the 
money in carriers or as cargo. Cash is also placed through currency exchanges where 
criminals purchase foreign currencies using the proceeds of their wrongdoings. 
Resources can also be converted into other assets like gold, precious stones or 
exchanged into other currencies of larger denominations to facilitate transportation and 
avoid detection. The use of non-bank institutions is also prevalent where smugglers 
launder a large sum of money by using cash in casino ships or obtaining refunds of un-
used flight tickets. Others also invest in government bonds. 
A common way of infiltrating ‘dirty money' in the financial system is offshore finance. 
This refers to institutions that host independent economic activities and are separated 
from the current institutions by legislation and/or geography (Mitsilegas and Bill, 2007). 
Typical examples of offshore financial activities include the practice of offshore banking, 
offshore companies, offshore funds and captive insurance among others. The examples 
of locations where offshore institutions reside include Bermuda and Cayman Islands 
where most institutions specialize in captive insurance business while institutions in 
British Virgin Islands specialize in offshore company registration. Many of these 
institutions are located in areas with minimal authority, in small island economies or in 
microstates. Secrecy is one of the main attractions to money launders as the offshore 
banks specialize in international private banking. 
The second stage of money laundering is the layering or structuring stage. This step 
involves global movement of the money. The main purpose is to separate illegal money 
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from the source. Criminals may move the funds from one country to another or they 
may also divide money into portions and place them in various overseas banks. 
Launders are also keen to move money several times to elude detection at all costs. 
The final stage is integration. In this stage the main aim is to reunite the criminal with 
the money from legitimate sources.  This is done by paying for certain goods or services 
that have never existed or investment in legal activities where funds’ origins are difficult 
to detect, like the real estate market.  
 
1.2.2 Offshore Financial Centers as Money Laundering Havens 
1.2.2.1 What are offshore financial centers? 
Offshore centers have a very broad meaning and various definitions are attached to 
them. In fact, there is no specific definition to the term. Essentially, offshore financial 
centers are territories where the financial sector is separated from the international   
regulatory bodies and capital is mainly from by non-residents. The separation from the 
international regulatory bodies enables OFCs to operate under secrecy. This makes 
them good destinations for tax evaders and money launderers. The Caribbean is a good 
spot for OFCs because of its proximity to Unites States and Latin American countries. 
The Caribbean islands are only a short flight from the major financial centers of the East 
Coast yet they are far from the reach of some American regulations (Davis, 2008). 
When coupled with the ideal geographical destination, the Caribbean has become a hot 
spot for many OFCs. Similarly, other locations for OFCs are Hong Kong, Switzerland 
and Dubai among others.  Reputable offshore financial centers play a legitimate and 
integral role in international trade. The zero tax structure also allows for financial 
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planning and risk management and acts as mediums of global trade. OFCs have 
support from both United States and UK since they help them diversify their economies 
and facilitate the British Eurobond market (Mceledon, 2010). Following the G20 meeting 
in 2009, offshore centers have been subject to increased scrutiny. Particularly, the 
initiatives spearheaded by FATF, OECD and IMF have had a significant effect on the 
offshore centers.  Accordingly, the offshore centers have strengthened their internal 
controls to guard against efforts to curb money laundering.  Most of the OFCs became 
prominent because of their structures that have assisted in minimizing the exposure to 
tax, hence they are referred to as tax havens. Pressure groups suggests that OFCs 
engage in unfair tax competition by having very low tax burdens to the customers and 
have further argued that  such financial centers should be forced to tax their own 
citizens and their economic activity at a higher level (Mceledon, 2010). In most cases, 
offshore centers attract people because of their low involvement on regulations. For 
instance, many capital market bonds use OFCs as mediums to issue them to minimize 
the amount of regulatory procedures associated with issuing of bonds. The minimal 
regulations present in the facilities make them attract money launderers. Besides, 
offshore jurisdictions offer high levels of confidentiality to their clients. The OFCS also 
act as a conduit of international trade and facilitate international capital flows. Therefore, 
they are becoming effective mediums for investment into emerging markets. Despite the 
use of the OFCs for legitimate reason, they are also used for illicit purposes. Individuals 
can use OFCs for creditor avoidance. This occurs when a person is evading the effect 
of bankruptcy by transferring assets and cash into anonymous offshore accounts that 
are untraceable. Individuals also use OFCs to unlawfully evade tax by failure to declare 
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profits made by offshore vehicles that they own. On this basis, money launders use the 
OFCs to inject money into the financial institutions. 
1.2.2.2 The role of OFCs in money laundering 
Money launderers use OFCs as avenues of placing money in the economic systems. 
Money laundering is a major illegal activity that the offshore centers facilitate. Money 
laundering and offshore centers are intertwined in such a way that it is impossible to 
mention one without the other. Concealing money is a major objective for money 
launderers, hence the OFCs become an ideal place to conceal their funds because of 
their secrecy. Particularly, the OFCs are involved in the layering stage of the money 
laundering process. During this stage, the money in the banks is moved to the offshore 
centers where there are fewer regulations. In these centers, the money is discretely 
transferred to other business around the world. The criminals create fake transactions 
that aim at distancing the money from the original source (Davis, 2008).The money can 
be transferred several times through many accounts around the world to create a trail 
that is difficult for the authorities to follow. The OFCs serve various roles in the money 
laundering process. First, they create a barrier between the authorities and where the 
funds are generated. Secrecy is another role that OFCs play in the money laundering 
process. Secrecy is used for legitimate purposes, however; it entices people to use it for 
illicit purposes. It makes money difficult to track due to the confidentiality that the 
facilities offer. 
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1.3 IMPACTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
1.3.1 Increased crime and terrorist financing 
Laundered money is used to fund and facilitate criminal activities. The practice 
promotes crimes such as drug dealing, illegal arms trafficking, racketeering and 
terrorism among others.  Laundering makes illegal activities profitable. Notably, 
corruption increases money laundering hence increasing laundering in developing 
countries where corruption rates are high. Corruption facilitates money laundering by 
professionals such as lawyers, accountants and employees in financial institutions. The 
presence of a weak anti-money-laundering policy provides a loophole for this crime. 
Complex financial systems are commonly targeted by individuals laundering money. 
Following the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2011, international 
organizations such as the UN embraced the importance of curbing financing of 
terrorism. This paved way for the strengthening of the Counter Terrorism financing 
Network (CFL) that prevents terrorist financing. 
1.3.2 The economic effects of money laundering 
The criminals use leading companies as havens for laundering where the illicit activities 
are integrated into the legitimate business. For example, in the United States, pizza 
parlors act as a haven  for organized crime such as drug trafficking. Often, these front 
companies are compelled to sell their products and services at a relatively lower price 
below the actual cost of production. Therefore, the front companies have a competitive 
advantage over the legitimate firms in the area (MacDowell, 2001). As an outcome, the 
legitimate business finds it difficult to compete against the front companies and may 
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eventually shut down. In the long run, the private sector is crowded with criminal 
organizations that ignore the principles of legitimate business (MacDowell, 2001). 
The integrity of financial institutions is adversely affected by money laundering. There is 
a gray area between the non-corrupt and the totally corrupt financial institutions where 
bank failure is closely associated to criminal activities. This is because it is difficult for 
corrupt   financial institutions that rely on money laundering to manage their assets and 
liabilities. Particularly it is difficult for them to maintain their liquidity position since huge 
sums of cash are deposited at a go and are later withdrawn suddenly without the 
management noticing. For example, the S&L crisis in Unites States in the 1990s was 
facilitated by money laundering, bribery and fraud (Levi& Reuter, 2006).Money 
laundering not only affects banks but also affects other financial institution such as 
insurance, security and investment firms. Involvement in money laundering further 
tarnishes the image of the financial institution involved pose legal risks to the 
institutions. As a result of crime, some contracts with fraudulent customers are 
unenforceable making the company suffer huge losses. The bank directors risk criminal 
prosecution for involvement in money laundering regardless of whether they are directly 
involved or not. Usually, the bank officials are under pressure to bring customers into 
the firm which facilitates their involvement in the money laundering process. Arguably, 
most western banks survive due to the proceeds of laundered money (MacDowell, 
2011). 
Estimates by the former managing director of the International Money Fund indicate the 
magnitude of the money laundered is about two to five percent of the world gross 
domestic product (MacDowell, 2011). In developing countries, these proceeds may 
15 
 
dwarf the government budgets and result to loss of control of the economy policy by the 
government. Money laundering has therefore adversely affected the currencies and 
interest rates in the affected counties. This is due to the fact that launderers reinvest 
where they are less likely to be undetected and in most cases, that is where the rates of 
returns are higher. A major consequence is that money laundering can cause instability 
in a country due to misallocation of resources from artificial distortions in asset and 
commodity price. Thus, money laundering can result in variations in the demand for 
money and increase the volatility of international capital flows, exchange and interest 
rates. The unpredictable nature of money laundering coupled with the loss of policy 
control may cripple effectiveness of economic policies. 
In simple terms, money launders are not interested in generating profit but rather in 
protecting their money. Hence, they ‘invest’ in activities that are not beneficial to the 
economy of a country. The majority of the individuals redirect funds from high-quality 
investments to low-quality investments to conceal their proceeds, thus economic growth 
can suffer.  Accordingly, when these launderers abandon such industries, they cause 
them to collapse, thereby negatively affecting the economy (Crime and Misconduct 
Commission, 2005). 
1.3.3 Increase in social costs 
There are several costs and risks that are associated with money laundering. Ideally, 
money laundering facilitates criminal activities. It creates a way where drug traffickers, 
terrorists and other criminals expand their activities. In the long run, this elevates costs 
to government as a result of increasing law enforcement. Another socio-economic effect 
of money laundering is that it transfers economic power from the market, citizens and 
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government to the delinquents. Generally, this brings about a major challenge. The 
complex nature of money laundering requires international cooperation and the set 
global standards to curb the vice. 
2.0 REGULATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
2.1International regulation of money laundering 
International money laundering law sets the pace for all the countries in their fight 
against money laundering. The establishment of international jurisdiction authorities 
such as the G7s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has promoted the international 
response to combat money laundering. FATF is a policymaking body that currently has 
a membership of 31 countries and territories and two regional organizations. FATF 
gives a report on the money laundering trends helping the member states to keep track 
the new techniques used by criminals among other developments in the area of money 
laundering. The signing of 1998’s UN declaration against money laundering was 
developed to prevent the illicit drug trade. There is a need for global structures with 
compatible legislation coupled with mutual legal assistance to facilitate financial 
investigation and confiscation of any proceeds of crime. Over decades, United States 
has been at the forefront in placing anti-laundering measures to disrupt drug trade. They 
have received support from other countries such as United Kingdom, France and 
Australia. The Egmont Group of Financial Investigation Units has aimed at fostering 
cross-national co-operation since the 1990s.  Nevertheless, there is a slow progression 
of the adoption of FAFT as a guideline to anti-money laundering. As a result, in 2000, 
the Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories Initiative was established with its 
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principal jurisdiction targeted at blacklisting the counties that are not adopting FAFT and 
posing severe sanctions for them. 
2.2 International Standard Setters of International Money Laundering Policies 
2.2.1The United Nations  
The United Nations was the first organization to fight the issue of money laundering.  
Currently, the UN has a 191 member states as its members. This has made it easier for 
the United Nations to create awareness on the various ways of thwarting money 
laundering. Moreover, the United Nation operates the Global Program against Money 
Laundering (GPML)headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The United Nations has the 
jurisdiction to adopt international treaties that have the effect of law in the country once 
the country has signed and implemented the convention. 
Through the United Nations Drug Control Program, the UN initiated the Vienna 
Convention, an international agreement to combat money laundering and drug 
trafficking. It mainly deals with provisions to fight illegal drug trade and the related law 
enforcement issues (Aldridge, 2008). The convention defines money laundering and 
advocates for the criminalization of money laundering. To date, 169 countries are part of 
the convention. 
The Palermo convention has also been a big contribution in the fight against money 
laundering. It obligates each ratifying country to criminalize money laundering. Further, 
it obligates the countries to formulate regimes to facilitate the detection of money 
laundering including record keeping and reporting any suspicious transaction. The 
Palermo convention also facilitates the exchange of information among law enforcement 
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authorities both domestically and internationally. Besides, it also fosters international 
cooperation among member states. 
The Global Program against money laundering (GPML), for instance, is a research 
project that aims to increase the effectiveness of the global action against money 
laundering.  The GPML assists member states create legal frameworks that support 
anti-money laundering legislation. It also develops institutional capacity particularly with 
the creation of finance intelligence units.  Hence, the GPML acts assist in disseminating 
information and providing technical assistance in formulating and improving a country’s 
AML infrastructure. 
2.2.2The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering was formed in 1989 by G-7 
countries. The main purpose of the intergovernmental body is to establish and promote 
an international response to combat money laundering. Due to the increase of terrorism 
financing through the illegal money, in October 2001, the FATF expanded its mission to 
include combating the financing of terrorism. The FATF is a policy making body that 
incorporates legal, financial and law enforcement experts to achieve national legislation 
and provide AML and CFT reforms. In addition, the intergovernmental body works 
closely with the other international bodies to fight the issue of money laundering. 
Currently FATF consists of 31 member states and two regional organizations. The three 
primary functions of FATF are to monitor member’s progress in implementing AML, 
reviewing and reporting laundering trends, and promoting the adoption and 
implementation of FATF anti-money laundering standards globally. Further, the FATF 
has developed a set of forty recommendations comprising a comprehensive AML 
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framework designed for universal application by countries around the world. The forty 
recommendations are a set of principles of action that allow a country’s flexibility in 
implementing the FATF according to its constitutional requirements (Financial Action 
Task Force, 2004). In this regard, the forty recommendations have acted as a reference 
for the international community on anti-money laundering standards and regulations. 
Ideally, the forty recommendations ask for action by each country if it wants to be 
viewed by the international community as one embracing and meeting the international 
standards on anti-money laundering. Often, the progress of the member states is 
closely monitored to ensure that they comply with the forty recommendations.  
Monitoring of the progress takes place in two distinct steps, which involve self-
assessment and mutual evaluations. Ultimately, if a member state fails to comply with 
these recommendations, the membership of the country risks being suspended. One of 
the core functions of the FATF is to report on the money laundering trends and 
techniques. The FATF works by issuing annual reports on money laundering through its 
Typologies report. The reports are vital as they provide information on the current 
techniques criminals use to launder money not only to the member states, but to all 
countries globally. 
The FATF also identifies non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) to encourage 
all countries to adopt anti-money laundering measures. An NCCT country is 
encouraged to make progress in remedying the deficiencies. If the country fails to make 
sufficient progress, FATF member states impose actions against the country, which 
seek to limit the business transactions with the entities within the NCCT.  Eventually, the 
FATF member countries may terminate any financial transactions with such a country. 
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Consequently, countries have made effort to be taken off the NCCT list since it causes 
major problems to their financial institutions and business with regard to international 
transactions. The FATF, alongside the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
has adopted an assessment methodology for the financial sector and offshore center 
programs. According to Schott (2006), the methodology comprises of institutional 
AML/CFT framework for a country and relevant elements from the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution and International conventions. The adoption of this 
comprehensive assessment methodology has facilitated a more uniform approach in 
conducting assessments in rating the country’s performance. 
2.2.3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
This Basel committee was formed in 1974 by the central bank governors hailing from a 
group of ten countries. The Basel committee formulates supervisory standards and 
guidelines on a wide scope of bank supervisory issues. The guidelines are formulated 
with the anticipation that each country will take the required steps to implement them in 
a way that best suits the country. The committee has three guidelines regarding the 
money laundering issue. To this effect, the Basal committee issued a statement of 
prevention.  It acts as a to- do-list that assists bank managers in suppressing money 
laundering through the banking system (Schott, 2006).The committee considers it an 
essential step towards combating money laundering since banks facilitate the money 
laundering process. The statement of prevention provides principles that facilitate 
proper customer identification, cooperation with law enforcement authorities, high 
ethical standards, and compliance with the laws, principles and policies to adhere to the 
statement. Therefore, the bank should make reasonable efforts to determine the identity 
21 
 
of all customers requesting financial services. Secondly, the banks should ensure that 
business transactions conform to ethical standards and adhere to the relevant laws 
pertaining financial transactions. The bank should as well not offer services to 
individuals who they believe are associated with money laundering. The statement 
emphasizes that banks should work with the law enforcement authority and must report 
any cases of money laundering. Proper training on the bank policies should equally be 
provided to allow for detection of money laundering. These are the grounds ensuring 
that the Basel committee provides a comprehensive blueprint for an efficient bank 
supervision system.  
2.3.4 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
As part of the efforts against money laundering, governments have formulated agencies 
to analyze information submitted by covered entities and persons pursuant to money 
laundering reporting requirements. Such agents are referred to as financial intelligence 
units (Davidson, 2014). These units act as a focal point for the national anti-money 
money laundering since they allow for the exchange of information between financial 
institutions and law enforcement agents (Davidson, 2014). There is a need to exchange 
information since the money laundering affects all countries.  The Egmont Group of 
Financial intelligence was formed in 1995 by several government units. The main aim of 
the group is to provide a forum for the financial intelligence units to enhance support for 
each of the country’s AML programs and coordinate the AML initiatives. It provides 
support through the exchange of financial intelligence information and improving 
expertise by fostering better communication. Currently, the membership of Egmont 
Group consists of 94 jurisdictions. The members access a secure website which is 
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strictly for the member, and this facilitates secure exchange of information. The group 
has produced materials which the public can access and has compiled cases about the 
fight against money laundering from its member FIUs. 
2.3.5 The IMF and World Bank 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been at the forefront in 
combating money laundering. Combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) was 
formulated through the establishment of the Offshore Financial Centre (OFC) program 
that was formulated in July 2000. The main purpose of the program was to provide 
voluntary assessment to the offshore financial centers and ensure their compliance with 
the various international standards on insurance, banking and other relevant sectors 
(Kyriakos-saad et al, 2005). The major aim of the program was to assess the potential 
vulnerabilities and threats to financial stability to the relevant offshore economies. The 
establishment of the OFC program was due to a call by the G-7 governments to take 
action against the abuse of the global financial system to guarantee integrity and 
credibility. The G-7 required the International financial institutions to reinforce 
governance and the existing anti-money laundering programs with the member 
countries. The IMF recognizes the importance of maintaining the integrity of the 
financial system hence it implemented this OFC program to fight financial crime, 
particularly money laundering (Schott, 2006). 
The IMF recognizes the role of the Financial Action Task Force and the Forty 
Recommendations as an appropriate anti-money laundering standard. The Executive 
Board of the IMF further recognizes the vigorous national and international efforts, 
which include advocacy for a sound financial system. The terrorist attacks on 
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September 11, 2011 reinforced the determination of the IMF to combat money 
laundering since it finances terrorism. 
The IMF reinforced the joint IMF-World Bank anti-money laundering policy so as to 
combat money laundering. Particularly, the IMF strategy was to expand the 
methodology for the assessment of the offshore centers, as well as onshore 
assessments of the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The IMF further 
contributed to the revision of the Forty Recommendations and increased the technical 
assistance to correct any deficiencies that arise in a country’s anti-money laundering 
regulations (Schott, 2006).The IMF reinforced the joint IMF-World Bank anti-money 
laundering policy so as to combat money laundering. Particularly, the IMF strategy was 
to expand the methodology for the assessment of the offshore centers, as well as 
onshore assessments of the Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The IMF 
further contributed to the revision of the Forty Recommendations and increased the 
technical assistance to correct any deficiencies that arise in a country’s anti-money 
laundering regulations (Kyriakos-Saad et al, 2005). 
In 2002, the IMF deepened its work on anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism. This was through the amendment of the Forty Recommendations 
and the FATF special recommendations on financing terrorism. The significant changes  
included  introduction of risk-based operation of customer due diligence, extension of 
the AML/CFT requirements especially customer due diligence, record keeping to certain 
non-financial businesses,  specifying the minimal list of categories  of predicate crimes 
for money laundering and  prohibiting shell banks and improving transparency of legal 
persons and arrangements. The revised FATF came into effect in February 2004 and 
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since, the new developments have assisted the IMF in the OFC assessments (Schott, 
2006). The legislations by international standard setters such as the Basel committee 
on banking supervision have also assisted the IMF in meeting its objectives. 
Following these revisions, the IMF affirmed its responsibility in assessing the 
commitment of the countries to implement AML/CFT laws. As such, the IMF-World Bank 
technical assistance has increased considerably, expanding the organization’s focus to 
provision of assistance, drafting of the relevant laws and regulations, identification of 
preventative measures and the training and establishment of financial intelligence units. 
Currently, the IMF has technical assistance projects that benefit more than 130 
countries. The IMF has so far delivered 200 new projects and trained 1000 officials on 
the aspects of AML/CFT (Schott, 2006). 
2.3 Outcomes of anti-laundering measures  
Given the importance of this matter, the progress has been remarkable since money 
laundering has been limited in most countries (Walker and Unger, 2009). The global 
legal landscape has changed in almost every country adopting anti-money laundering 
measures, including offshore financial centers. This has been facilitated by the adoption 
of the FAFT, and more and more countries have become world leaders in advocating 
for anti-money laundering legislations (Geiger and Wuensch, 2007; Walker & Unger, 
2009). Still, money laundering techniques vary over time due to the varying skills set 
and contacts of the criminal. There is a need to identify and device mechanisms to 
understand and eliminate the current techniques that are used in money laundering. 
25 
 
3.0 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention does not clarify on how best to share 
information but rather gives different forms of exchanging information. In the past, 
information was only obtained on request. Nowadays, this is also present, but 
information can also be transferred spontaneously and automatically. 
3.1 Spontaneous exchange of information 
This involves providing relevant information to the contracting party upon request. This 
mode of exchange of information relies on the active participation of the cooperating 
countries. Local tax officials need to have the ability to pass information to the authority. 
Financial institutions also need to have the capacity to give information on instances of 
money laundering to governments. 
3.1.1 Functioning of spontaneous exchange of information 
Each country has different reasons to consider the automatic exchange of information. 
These may be the suspicion of money laundering or alleging the loss of tax revenue 
through tax avoidance. The checklist of the OCED concludes the identification of the 
person whom the information relates, the information about the payment or transaction, 
the gathered information and the explanation of why this information is thought to be 
important (OECD Committee on fiscal Affairs, 2006). The checklist is not only useful to 
get tax evaders but also to identify money launderers. Feedback between authorities 
will ensure transparency and supplement the fight towards curbing money laundering. 
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3.2 Automatic Exchange of Information 
The Automatic Exchange of information was adopted in 2012. It is considered beneficial 
since the information is not provided when Government has intentions of sharing 
financial data but rather automatically. In May 2013, the European council agreed to 
give priority to efforts aimed at extending automatic exchange of information at a global 
level. The new directive is based on FACTA and the European Union (EU) savings 
directive commonly known as the CRS (Common Reporting Standard). 
3.2.1 Benefits of the automatic exchange of information 
AEOI is valuable as it allows for the exchange of necessary information for tax 
purposes. It is a great tool in ensuring cooperation and global transparency. It is a 
proactive tool as it informs the relevant countries of the wealth of the individuals that 
may be hidden in offshore accounts. Money launderers mainly use tax havens such as 
offshore accounts. Tax heavens are regions that provide an extensive variety of 
regulations offering tax rate benefits and high level of banking privacy to foreign and 
local companies. These offshore accounts protect money launderers as they provide 
customer confidentiality and protect monetary transactions (Mceledon, 2010). Since the 
inception of automatic exchange of information by OECD, there has been a widespread 
use of automatic exchange of information between countries. Particularly, within the EU 
many member states have created automatic exchange relationships with non-EU 
members providing a platform for timely reporting of non-compliance of tax. All of the 
EU countries receive information automatically from the treaty partners and 85 percent 
of them in turn send information to treaty partner’s hence increasing transparency 
(OECD, 2012).The OCED has formulated a minimum standard and aims at 
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implementing the global standard in 2017 in the committed jurisdictions. The OCED is 
working together with the G20 and the global forum to provide necessary tools to 
provide guidance and enhance global consistency. With the reduction in bank secrecy, 
it will be easier to catch money smugglers and bring them to justice. Governments will 
also reduce tax evasions and thus gain more tax income. The common reporting 
standard will thus increase the reporting requirements for the financial institutions and 
the new form of reporting will assist the countries to catch the money launderers. 
4.0 Challenges of Implementation of AML Measures 
The anti-money laundering efforts are commendable. However, their implementation 
has faced various challenges. AML instruments are essential as they ensure that the 
international community reacts to money laundering as a common global problem. The 
international instruments provide an agenda for converging national efforts to help fight 
against money laundering internationally. Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
various loopholes are present in the international and national level that hinders the 
proper implementation of anti-money laundering legislations. The implementation of the 
AML also faces various challenges that further hinder the efforts to combat money 
laundering. Some of the challenges include: 
4.1 Technology  
The rapid growth of technology has hindered the efforts to fight money laundering. 
Technology has not only improved the money laundering process but also provided the 
launderers with new techniques that are difficult to monitor. The speed at which 
technology is growing does not match up with the laws by the enforcement agencies 
(Dumitrache and Modiga, n.d). The techniques used to launder money evolve quickly 
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thus making it hard for the institutions to cope. For example, the electronic payment 
systems offer anonymity and convenience of the funds. The bank institutions also have 
not regulated most of the new payment systems that are available giving the criminals a 
wide range of channels to place the ‘dirty money’ in the financial systems (Dumitrache 
and Modiga, n.d). The use of pre-paid cards, mobile payments, and internet payment 
products mean that money can exchange hands rapidly. Criminals may also propagate 
cyber-attacks that create vulnerabilities that facilitate money laundering. Corrupting the 
banking system via a cyber-attack is a new direction that the criminals are using to 
launder money (Levi and Reuter, 2006). Online systems are used by the criminals in the 
layering stage when they are carrying out transactions between different countries. The 
convenience of these systems has made them very attractive to money launderers. The 
presence of the online gambling systems where there are virtual casinos has also 
provided criminals ways to launder money. Besides, the emergence of online games 
has further made it difficult to combat money laundering. Online games such as 
Entropia Universe and Second Life provide an opportunity for the money launderers to 
conceal transfers of fraudulent income (Dumitrache and Modiga, n.d) 
4.2 Financial exclusion 
According to the FATF (2011), financial exclusion is a challenge towards effective 
AML/CFT policies. Financial inclusion refers to the provision of adequate safe and 
affordable financial services to the vulnerable groups including low income earners, 
rural and undocumented persons who are excluded from the formal financial sector. It is 
also ensuring that a broader range of financial products is available to the 
disadvantaged groups. This challenge is mainly present in developing countries where 
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the poor are excluded from the formal financial sector. Today, more than half the world’s 
adult population lacks access to insurance, credit facilities,  savings accounts and other 
formal financial services (FATF, 2011). Financial exclusion limits the ability of the 
vulnerable populations to manage their cash flows, build savings and capital and to 
mitigate economic shocks. Accordingly, it is estimated that less than 10% of poor 
people are able to access the formal financial services. In developing countries, the 
number of unbanked adults is estimated to be 2.7 billion while in developed countries 
the number of unbanked adults is 160 million. In 2005, it is estimated that a quarter of 
the population in the developing world was living in absolute poverty of USD 1.25 in a 
day. Immigrants are also affected by financial exclusion. In absence of formal banks, 
the underserved populations rely on informal ways to send money back home. In 
developing countries, there is a cash-based and parallel economy where money 
circulates outside the conventional financial system. The financially excluded individuals 
hence prefer these avenues since they are convenient. However, these channels are 
vulnerable to misuse by money launders because the channels are not controlled by the 
government. Ideally, the more attractive the underground economy is for legitimate 
transactions, the more available it is for illegal transactions. The underground providers 
act as a channel through which money launders place money in the financial system 
since they are undetectable by government authorities. Financial exclusion is thus 
encourages money laundering activities that cripples the implementation of AML 
measures (FAFT, 2011). Promoting the use of formal financial system is essential in 
ensuring a comprehensive and effective AML/CFT regime. 
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4.3 The costs associated with compliance 
The implementation of anti-money laundering laws is also a challenge in low income 
countries in the developing world. There are several compliance costs that countries 
and their financial institutions are required to incur as they implement the AML 
regulations.  Most developing countries have small economies, thus adding additional 
cost to them is strenuous. Due the low income levels, these countries are unable to 
effectively implement the AML laws; laundering legislations also require banks to 
comply with activities such as record keeping, internal control and the reporting of 
suspicious transactions. In order to easily detect illicit transactions, banks invest and 
develop internal controls procedures and human resources. Training of staff is another 
cost that the banks incur. The FATF recommendations recommend entities to develop 
an efficient process of customer identification. These obligations increase the cost of 
financial products hence increasing the number of people financially excluded. The 
increase in the financial costs is a disincentive to customers especially the 
disadvantaged individuals who may turn to unconventional channels of accessing cash. 
In developing countries, most of the financial systems are small and immature making it 
hard for them to invest in the costs needed in implementing the AML regulations.  
What’s more, most institutions yearn to increase their profit share thus may be less 
selective in the business they conduct making them vulnerable to money laundering. 
The current regulatory climate has some strict rules put in place to guide financial 
institutions. However, there is no evidence indicating that the massive costs imposed on 
banks are effective in reducing money laundering. In July 2015 for example, Banamex 
USA paid a fine amounting to $140 million for allegedly having weak anti-money 
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laundering policies while in 2014, Standard Charted paid a fine of $300 million for 
purported weakness in its AML monitoring system in its New York’s branch (Saperstein 
et al, 2015). These are examples of a trend where regulators place huge fines on banks 
even if the regulators do not identify any instances of money laundering in the entities. 
Most international banks spend enormous amounts of money to finance anti-money 
laundering compliance. Current estimates indicate that HSBC devotes USD 750 million 
to USD 800 million for compliance (Saperstein et al, 2015).The fight against money 
laundering has shadowed the core business of banking such as providing loans and 
banking services. The regulators have shifted focus to how much the entities spend on 
compliance as opposed to the effectiveness of the compliance efforts (Saperstein et al, 
2015). This is a challenge to the implementation of the AML regulations. In any case, 
the regulators have performed little empirical research to justify the presumption that 
high costs assist the AML strategies.  
The increase in the costs has made the banks retreat from high-risk regions. This ‘de-
risking’ has reduced the transparency of financial activity making the entities more 
susceptible to criminals (Saperstein et al, 2015).For example, all the major banks in the 
UK and United States have abdicated wire transfers to Somalia to avoid the risk of the 
money ending up with terrorists. This has caused a humanitarian tragedy since most of 
the families in Somalia rely on money from abroad sent by their relatives. Consequently, 
Somali nationals living in the United States have opted to use third party agents who 
ferry the money in suitcases on flights to Somalia. The money flowing into Somalia has 
become unregulated, untraceable and expensive for the Somalis living from hand-to-
mouth. The end result is a riskier channel for money laundering than if the banks had 
32 
 
continued wiring the money. De-risking also referred to as de-banking is a practice 
where  financial institutions exit relationships and close  the accounts of clients   
perceived as “high risk” (Durner and Shetret, 2015). Financial institutions choose to end 
the relationship altogether rather than manage risky clients who are involved in money 
laundering. De-risking hence increases financial exclusion in the developing world; 
further, posing a challenge to the implementation of the AML regulations. Along the 
Mexican border, the closure of the Banamex subsidiary by Citigroup eliminated eleven 
branches in the Southwest. Due to the closure, long term accounts of cash intensive 
businesses like farming and ranching were affected. The result of the closure was the 
businesses moving into cash based transactions since they still had to continue paying 
their service providers. This has spread the risk of money laundering. This is an 
example of how the immense pressure on the banks placed by regulators produces 
unintended consequences. The moving of banks from high-risk regions forces entities to 
disguise cash holdings and leads to an increase in transactions. The resultant entities 
then transfer the funds through underground channels  (Saperstein et al, 2015). 
Accordingly, the regulators have made it difficult to catch money launderers due to the 
increased avenues for money launderers and strengthening of criminal networks. When 
the banks spend a lot of money in compliance, the money is not available for the 
running of the banking system. Customers are burdened with the increase in banking 
fees and more onerous bank rates which in turn hamper the economic growth of a 
country. More importantly, the people affected are those in regions that are at high risk 
of money laundering. The regulators should have a valid reason for imposing high costs 
to the banks to avoid implementing laws that worsen the issue of money laundering. 
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5.4 Corruption 
Corruption is another challenge the regulators face in the implementation of AML 
regulations. Corruption takes advantage of the implementation of AML measures in the 
countries and frustrates the trans-national cooperation to investigate money laundering 
in different countries. Corruption impedes the enforcement of AML measures and also 
creates confusion in the implementing agencies within a country. The wide range of 
AML regulations bring together treasury departments, financial intelligence units, 
Attorney Generals, Directors of Public prosecutions, Intelligence operatives, Ministry of 
Justice, intelligence operatives, Central Banks, and revenue authorities among others. 
When these institutions are corrupt, there is a hindrance in the implementation of AML 
regulations. Corrupt individuals can exploit the leadership of the anti-money laundering 
structures, thus incapacitating them. A survey on money laundering through 
intermediaries discloses the involvement of bureau de exchanges, banks, lawyers 
acting as nominees, investment advisers and estate agents in money laundering 
(Gordena and Madzima, 2009). The banks have played a significant role in transferring 
of funds from the accounts held in the country to offshore accounts. This has been 
attributed to the corrupt nature of these banks. Some banks have been accused of 
advising clients to evade taxes by creating offshore companies which declare no profit. 
According to Chaikin (2008), the risks brought about by commercial corruption are 
present in the placement stage of money laundering. Individuals in the private sector 
may be bribed to collude and engage in money laundering, non-reporting of suspicious 
activity or tip off clients who should be subject to government investigation. The 
concealment of business activities through financial intermediaries further affects the 
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detection of this illicit activity. The employees in the financial institutions may be bribed 
to overlook the presence of any suspicious transaction, falsify documents, and overlook 
suspected documents (Gordena and Madzima, 2009). Bank officials may be paid to 
look the other way as illicit funds are siphoned from banks to offshore centers. 
Corruption activities committed by highly ranked politicians and senior government 
officials have facilitated the transfer of funds from the national treasury to private hands.  
With all this happening across the world, corruption therefore continues to be a threat to 
the implementation of AML initiatives. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Globally, money laundering continues to be the most common form of financial crime.  
Notably, the advancement in technology has further facilitated money laundering 
particularly with the availability of electronic transfers, online gaming, and virtual 
casinos. Money launderers find it safer to deposit ‘dirty money' in other countries to 
reduce the risk of them being caught. The availability of private financial institutions 
such as the offshore financial centers has also elevated the smuggling of cash (Ryder, 
2008). In reaction, most countries have enacted anti-money laundering legislations that 
are widely used to curb money laundering. The major focus is on non-complying 
countries that ignore the FATF and the United Nations directive. The offshore centers 
are major elements undermining the fight against money laundering. This is because 
they play a critical role in the layering phase in the money laundering process.  
The OFCs also facilitate the transfer of funds from one country to another. The secrecy 
of these financial institutions facilitates this process, making it difficult to note any 
suspicious activity.  Moreover, the transactions cannot be traced, thus making them a 
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favorite spot for money launderers. There has been a lot of pressure on the offshore 
financial centers as most of them are non-compliant. Particularly, the advisories issued 
by Britain and United States against Barbuda and Antigua have resulted in the 
amendment of the Antiguan anti-money smuggling laws. The private sector has also 
been encouraged to extend their due diligence in curbing the vice (Ryder, 2008). 
The collaborative efforts of the FATF, OECD, UN, the World Bank and IMF have 
encouraged the fight against incidences of  money laundering  by encouraging nations 
to set policies aimed at combating money laundering, some of the nations  with AML 
deficiencies  that have pledged their commitment  include Yemen, Vanuatu, Uganda 
among others (FATF, 2016). FATF has intensified close monitoring to ensure that 
nations with strategic deficiencies comply countries such as Guyana are no longer 
subject to FATF’s on-going global AML/CFT compliance process since they have 
established a legal and regulatory framework to meet FATF requirements (FATF, 
2016).However, the high costs associated with the implementation of the AML policies 
have made it difficult for countries to realize achievements. The high costs have 
increased plus the cost of financial products for the customer, which has resulted in 
financial exclusion of most of the disadvantaged groups in the society, especially the 
poor. The high numbers of financially-excluded individuals has resulted in increased use 
of cash-based transactions further facilitating the increase of money laundering despite 
the presence of AML policies. The increased costs associated with compliance to the 
AML regulations have additionally caused de-risking of banks where they cease 
conducting business in high risk areas like terror torn zones. Consequently, individuals 
have embraced the smuggling of cash between borders via illicit ways. This practice 
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has simply created a channel through which money is laundered. Besides, the rapid 
growth of technology has been a challenge during the implementation of AML policies. 
Hence, the emergence of new ways of laundering money calls for the evaluation of the 
policies to provide diverse mechanisms concerning money laundering. Each country 
should as well lay out concrete plans to curb the smuggling of money. More 
transparency will also facilitate the financial systems to deal with the vice. 
Cooperation between countries is important for the effective implementation of the AML 
network. Particularly, it’s essential because different countries have different AML 
priorities. Furthermore, the challenges highlighted mean that the AML framework needs 
modification to curb money laundering. With respect to compliance, the AML systems 
faces some challenges  as some countries fail to ratify the policies while others have 
weak surveillance systems. The UN alongside other international bodies thus needs to 
formulate more stringent policies to enhance compliance by all countries. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In regards to corruption, the concerned countries should formulate anti-corruption 
strategic plans to curb corruption. The strategic plans should take cognizance of the 
broad themes of prevention, enforcement and public education. Creating public 
awareness on the effects of corruption provides necessary information to the public and 
facilitates reporting of corruption incidences from the public.  
Regulators should revise the AML framework due to technological developments that 
have opened new avenues of money laundering. To this effect, they should conduct 
empirical studies to determine the effectiveness of the AML regime and to also assist 
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them in devising new ways to counter money laundering.  Empirical studies will assist  
regulators obtain both qualitative and quantitative information. The statistics will assist 
them determine if the AML framework is working appropriately. In addition to that, each 
country has different external and internal money laundering threats.  Major financial 
centers in the US or UK face a wide range of threats that include complex fraud. 
Conversely, in developing countries, corruption and drug trade increase their 
vulnerability. In ensuring that the FATF and AML measures are effective, FATF should 
take into account these variations between nations. As such, FATF should work towards 
creating a tailor-made risk- based approach and encourage countries to perform a risk- 
assessment to assist them in formulating a more effective AML network. Tailor-made 
policies coupled with country by country evaluation will increase the compatibility of the 
AML network. 
All countries should also aim towards financial inclusion to eliminate the challenge it 
poses in the implementation of the AML measures. What’s more, achieving an optimal 
regulatory regime requires the concerned authorities to conduct a cost-benefit analysis 
of the purported benefits of the regulations against the alternative options. The analysis 
will assist in eliminating the unsuitable and cumbersome legislations. Through 
conducting a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the cost and benefits of the 
AML legislations, the regulators can objectively view the impact of regulations and verify 
if the laws hurt the public or worsen the issue of money laundering. Ideally, a regulation 
should not be undertaken if the potential benefits outweigh the potential costs to the 
society. The regulators should cut down the compliance costs to avoid burdening the 
customer and to ensure that low-income countries can afford the implementation 
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process. Further, financial institutions need to create awareness on the importance of 
using banks. This includes properly laying out the products that are offered in banks. 
The banks should also reduce the costs associated with banking to ensure that they 
include everyone, even the low-income earners. 
Lastly, there is need to understand that money laundering is not only a problem to the 
government but also to the public. Public awareness on the effects of money laundering 
should be done through the media and public events. The education system (especially 
in aspects such as banking, law, criminology, and public governance) should inculcate 
awareness of money laundering together with its consequences.  Moreover, there is 
need for proper exchange of information to facilitate the elimination of money 
laundering. Each country needs to be vigilant and strengthen the judicial system to 
ensure it appropriately deals with financial crimes such as money laundering. 
Synchronization of money laundering laws between countries is equally important in 
limiting the vice. 
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